The transition form a centrally planned to market economy in the Russian Federation has been a dynamic period in the country's development. Within the time frame 1992-2009, Russia's economy has been characterized by a marked lack of stability, high uncertainty, and insufficient transparency in the financial markets. Efforts to improve the efficiency in the manufacturing sector have been futile, as the country has had to rely primarily on its extractive sector, capitalizing on the oil and natural gas assets throughout its large territory. In addition, the legal system during the two terms of Boris Yeltsin was in stagnation, and only Vladimir Putin's reforms after 2000 achieved mediocre success in this field. The shocks in 1998 and 2008 have also exerted their impact on the Russian markets, slowing development significantly. As a result of these events, foreign direct investment in the Russian Federation has undergone dynamic changes in the past eighteen years. Despite the rapid surge in FDI in the period 2004-2007, the Global Financial Crisis has curbed its growth. Still fighting the effects of the credit crunch, Russia is currently in the process of recovery, attempting to attract a substantial number of foreign investors.
In this paper, I will argue that foreign direct investment in the period 1992-2009 has been determined by a combination of economic and political factors, including trade and tariffs, GDP, inflation, the size of the market, labor costs, the fiscal balance, the exchange rate, agglomerations effects, infrastructure, and the methods of privatization. I will also contend that the global financial conditions have had a relatively minor impact on the development of FDI and the primary Factors are, in effect, endogenous. A linear regression with ordinary least squares and selected independent variables can provide a forecast for the levels of FDI in the future. In order to correct for autocorrelations, I will utilize the ARIMA approach, as well. Finally, I will provide a viable prediction for the levels of FDI in the next few years.
This paper investigates whether there is a link between a nation's response to covid-19 and their current/future economic position. It uses New Zealand and the United States as case studies, and has the initial position that, since New Zealand had a more effective response to covid-19 and was able to control the virus at an earlier stage, then they should be in a better economic position, not only currently, but for the future. This is based on the key Keynesian principles of uncertainty, confidence, and investment. However, even though New Zealand has eliminated the virus and been able to completely open the country, compared to the United States, which is still in a battle with covid-19, the current economic data does not support the initial thesis. This could be due to either the economic data yet reflecting New Zealand's success, or the key Keynesian principle of irrationality. A follow up study in the future will be required to tell whether the initial thesis is correct.
My thesis investigated the life insurance industry prior to the financial crisis, as well as the vulnerabilities of the industry post-crisis. My studies have collectively affirmed that significant risks still remain and may pose detrimental effects to life insurers, perhaps forcing them to face insolvency if these risks occur together. Vulnerabilities, such as longevity risk, the interest rate environment, guarantees, and regulatory shortfalls, during the post-criss period have been largely overlooked. With lifespans increasing and interest rates remaining at unprecedented low levels, the life insurance market is exceptionally vulnerable and must be carefully evaluated with respect to its susceptibilities and investment approaches. As life insurance companies assume more risk, their derisking strategies, such as the use of reinsurance captives, are also associated with risks that are not well understood. Further research is necessary to analyze the performances of life insurers that are greatly intertwined with the banking industry and have heavily invested in securitization products.
This study continues the existing line of research into the generation of asset price bubbles in experimental markets. It breaks new ground by examining the impact of news that traders receive during the experimental sessions. It examines whether positive news would increase the magnitude of bubble formation in an experimental market. The outcome of the experiment showed that there were significant differences between the mean trading prices resulting from positive and neutral news. In addition, the survey questions noted several differences in responses that hint at the motivations behind the behavior that caused the formation of the bubbles. These findings suggest that traders in experimental markets are more influenced by news than by rational calculations of fundamental value.